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The collapse of communism sparked a wave 
of democratization that was characterized by dis-
tinctive development of democracy in post-com-
munist societies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Democratization processes in those societies 
have generated specific problems, including un-
certainty regarding the establishment of democ-
racy, its sustainability, and development. Among 
the others, a characteristic phenomenon that has 
characterized many transitional societies is strong 
nationalism. Moreover, it is often manifested as 
ethnocentrism (closed, exclusive and intoler-
ant ethnic nationalism), and as such contributed 
to the deceleration of democratization. On the 
other hand, nationalism was the driving force of 
the democratic change, especially in those post-
communist countries which for the first time in their 
history, parallel with the establishment of democ-
racy, gained state independence. Among them was 
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Nationalism has marked the democratic transition of many post-communist 
societies, including Croatia. It showed its liberal character by fostering demo-
cratic change and achieving national independence, but it also manifested itself 
as exclusive ethnocentrism, which considerably slowed down the democrati-
zation process and imposed itself as its main characteristic. The author chal-
lenges the view that ethnocentrism as inherent characteristic of the so-called 
Eastern (ethnic) nations, which are consequently undemocratic and prone to 
ethnic conflicts, while the liberal character is attributed as inherent to national-
ism of Western (civic) nations. Besides the explanation of various aspects of 
nationalism in Croatia, the author draws attention to its primary structural and 
contextual conditionality, particularly highlighting the framework of political un-
freedom and limited modernization during the communist period and specific 
conditions of democratic transition characterized by process of nation-state 
establishment and the war of independence. Here nationalism appears as an 
expression of patriotism and political identification, but also as a response to 
social, political and value discontinuity and particularly as reaction to external 
aggression. The author denies its inherency, since it is not some “innate” cul-
tural trait, but a social phenomenon that is dominantly caused by the social and 
political context. Nationalism in the period of democratic transition in Croatia, 
despite its undoubtedly ethnocentric manifestations, in essence still was liberal. 
After the war and renewed processes of democratization there was a significant 
decline of ethnocentrism and strengthening of liberal features of nationalism.
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it shares with other post-communist societies, its 
democratization was marked by some very specific 
conditions. Those are, primarily, secession from 
a multinational federation and the establishment 
of independent and sovereign nation-state, and a 
defensive war against the Greater Serbian aggres-
sion in order to protect newly acquired freedom 
and independence. These two key factors have 
essentially determined the dynamics and direction 
of democratization but also the emergence and 
manifestations of nationalism, which essentially 
marked the transition period.
Over the past two decades in many Western 
political and academic circles, nationalism in 
Croatia has often been declared as a retrograde 
phenomenon and a serious obstacle to democ-
ratization processes, with a usual emphasis of 
its ethnocentric features. There it was regularly 
placed in the so-called Eastern type nationalism, 
characteristic for unmodernized societies with 
postponed process of a nation forming, to which 
the ethnic conflicts are inherent.1 Although such 
claims could find a foothold, particularly based on 
the level of public manifestations of nationalism, 
basically they do not hold. In fact, nationalism is 
too complex a phenomenon that it could be un-
ambiguously defined, and even less understood 
outside a particular social and political context. 
Just because of that, modernization and democ-
ratization processes that characterized the his-
tory of established democracies are not entirely 
comparable with those in transitional societies. 
Hence, the conclusions about particular phe-
nomena (including nationalism and nation-state 
building) resulting from such comparisons are 
often inappropriate.
Therefore, the intention of this paper is to ex-
plain the historical and political-cultural aspects 
of nationalism in Croatia and its recent manifesta-
1 It is a cultural stereotype that one group of (Western) na-
tions should be considered intrinsically democratic, inclined 
to freedom, and prone to cosmopolitanism, while the other 
group (Eastern) should be considered s non-democratic, 
prone to autocracy, xenophobia and ethnocentrism, which 
apparently stems from ressentiments that arise from sup-
pressed feelings of dependence and the inability to over-
come them during their history. This stereotype, without any 
factual foundation and valid argument, is equated with the 
division in civic and ethnic nations, which has resulted in 
a highly simplified and inaccurate image in public opinion 
in Western societies, but also among some scholars. This 
image had a great influence on many politicians, especially 
on their (distorted) perception and (mis)understanding of 
the process of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the wars 
conducted in the region (characterized as “ancient ethnic 
hatreds” that cannot be stopped in a rational manner), that 
significantly influenced the incompetence and inefficiency 
of the international community in crisis mediation and con-
flict resolution in this region (cf. Matić, 2006: 261-266).
tions, but primarily to point to its structural condi-
tionality, in which it is almost not different to other 
nationalisms (including those in most developed 
Western societies). Also, the intention of the paper 
is to show that Croatian nationalism in the period 
of democratic transition, despite uncontested eth-
nocentric manifestations, essentially was liberal 
nationalism, seeking to realize statehood ideas 
that have marked modern national history.
2. Theoretical framework
Considering the phenomenon of nationalism in 
the context of democratic transition of the Croatian 
society, it is necessary, at least at a basic level, to 
analyze the meaning of the term, as well as key 
concepts that are directly related to it (people, 
nation, nation-state, liberal democracy). Since 
there are many controversies among theorists 
of nationalism about its definition, we will not go 
further into these disputes. Its meaning will be de-
termined in terms which are largely undisputed, 
and will serve as a starting point in the discussion 
in this context.
In that sense, one could argue that people 
means a community of people which arises under 
common territorial, economic and cultural factors 
that have enabled it to connect to people as an 
ethnic group. It appears in the period when tribal 
society grows into a broader territorial commu-
nity, bound by ethnic, linguistic and cultural af-
finity of its members, different in comparison to 
other communities. The nation is a people which 
are constituted as a political community. It grows 
from the freedom of civil societies (political and 
civil freedom, free market) which were established 
after the 18th and 19th century (civil and national) 
revolutions, shaping the modern civil society and 
state. In other words, a nation is established as a 
sovereign political community, i.e. political society 
(demos) based on the people’s community (ethnos) 
formed on common history, culture, language and 
territory.2 The nation-state in turn means the real-
ization of the sovereignty of the nation, politically, 
legally and territorially (including international rec-
ognition). The modern nation-state is inseparably 
linked with (liberal) democracy as a political order. 
Popular sovereignty implies, on the one hand, the 
right to self-determination, namely the political, ter-
ritorial and economic independence of the people, 
2 “What civil society, as the historical founder of modern 
society has created, is the political community of free 
citizens who, at the same time, are free to establish their 
historically shaped people’s community as a national 
community. People are free to set their internalized eth-
nic community as a political community, i.e., to establish 
it as its own nation” (Lerotić, 1984: 9).
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and, on the other hand, political power elected by 
the citizens which represents the general political 
will of the people and thus derives its legitimacy. 
The first aspect is a precondition of the nation-
state, while the second one is a precondition of 
a democratic political regime. That way, modern 
nations, as political communities, establish nation-
states as an expression of national and political 
sovereignty.3 A sense of collective identity and 
solidarity sprang from the principles of national 
democracy were shaped, while liberal principles 
constructed the institutional foundations for free 
development of individuals.
Nationalism as a term is so often used (in dif-
ferent contexts), yet its meaning is by no means 
unambiguous, quite the opposite. Therefore, na-
tionalism has at least several defining meanings. 
First, it is political awareness of ethnic cohesion 
and affiliation (political identity) and of common 
(national) interests. Second, it is a political ideol-
ogy that assumes the nation as the most important 
and fundamental determinant of society (it is the 
basis of political movements for national libera-
tion, national equality and the establishment and 
protection of the nation-state). Third, it means pref-
erence and protection of interests (of members) 
of their own nation to the interests (of members) 
of other nation(s). Fourth, it means highlighting of 
own nation’s characteristics and underestimation of 
those of another nation (which causes intolerance 
towards members of other nations, and in the ex-
treme case ethnic conflicts). Because of all these 
meanings, nationalism has a very strong value, 
political and socio-psychological character, both at 
the individual and social level. Therefrom derives 
its predominantly (and often ultimately) positive or 
negative evaluation among various political actors 
and citizens in various social environments, and 
different political ideologies and theories.
Following the above mentioned, it could be 
said that nationalism is generally manifested in 
two specific ways: first – liberal (civic, inclusive) 
nationalism, and second – ethnocentric (ethnic, 
exclusive) nationalism. Liberal nationalism reflects 
itself in the emancipatory role when nationalism 
serves national liberation, achievement of inde-
pendence, equality, freedom and the rights of the 
people. Such an expression of nationalism denotes 
openness, striving toward the realization of ethical 
values and includes the rights of others. In mod-
ern societies, this form of nationalism has strong 
cohesive and integrative functions. Specifically, 
3 Cf. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 
1789, Articles 3 and 6; Lerotić, 1984: 9-10; Prpić, Puhovski 
and Uzelac, 1990: 85-86; Rousseau, 1978: 101-102; Tadić, 
1988: 202.
the nation means the collective political identity; 
it provides a sense of belonging, both to the na-
tion as a political community (sovereign nation-
state) and to the nation as a people. In fact, most 
modern states were established as nation-states.
In this context, the nation is the expression of 
political identity (the common sense of belonging 
among the various social groups in society) and it 
is the basic precondition for a democratic regime. 
It is a political framework that provides basic so-
cial consensus in a society of diverse and mutu-
ally opposed social interests regarding issues of 
government, shape and choice of political power 
and definition of national interest. Although civil 
society (as a set of equal citizens united by the 
social contract) is a precondition for effective de-
mocracy, it does not have sufficient basis for the 
realization of social consensus, and cannot estab-
lish an effective and stable state without political 
identity. That identity in turn ensures the nation 
(a feeling of national belonging that integrates a 
certain society into a political community).
Nationalism has been an expression of libertar-
ian aspirations for many peoples in their struggle 
for national independence, freedom and sover-
eignty since 18th and 19th century revolutions, 
through the anti-colonial movements, until recent 
exoduses from multinational federations after the 
collapse of communism. Realization of a sover-
eign nation-state was their main goal, regardless 
of the historic period and social-political context. It 
is evident in examples of post-communist societies 
that have emerged from the former multinational 
states (USSR, Yugoslavia) which authoritarian 
regimes have been restricting political freedom 
of the people(s) trying to integrate them into a 
unified political community from above, on ideo-
logical basis. Likewise, it is also visible in recent 
examples of small nations and/or ethnic minori-
ties in the developed democratic countries of the 
West where civic consensus and democratic politi-
cal system are not sufficient factors of integration 
(and consequently the stability) of those political 
communities (such as Spain, Belgium, UK, Italy, 
France, Canada). It should be noted also that, de-
spite globalization processes and their tendency 
to create a global democracy – which, among the 
others, significantly reduce the sovereignty of the 
nation states – still remained an open question 
of political identity (formation of political com-
munity) and the problem of legitimacy (making 
of collectively binding decisions and subjecting 
to them) which are still dominant at the level of 
nation states. Consequently, nationalism is not 
some aberration of democracy, retrograde and 
anti-modern phenomenon, but rather the opposite. 
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Originally, it is in the basis of the modern nation-
state as a political community, an expression of 
people’s sovereignty and political subjectivity of 
the nation. Its characteristic outward expression, 
essentially, is patriotism.
Unlike liberal nationalism, ethnocentric nation-
alism is usually expressed through closed, autar-
chic and xenophobic attitudes towards (members 
of) other nations. National affiliation is above all, it 
is a central social and political value and a main 
criterion of social evaluation. In its ultimate form, 
it is based on (implicit or explicit) attitude of su-
periority of own nation over other nations, on lack 
of respect for them, and on denial of equal rights 
to others.4 Hence, the inequality, exclusion and 
uncooperativeness are in the very foundation of 
ethnocentrism. The nation is perceived as closed 
and homogenous group opposed to other nations 
(or their members). At the same time, members 
of one’s own nation are expected to be subjective 
to collective (national) values, and through their 
adoption individuals are primarily valued. Individu-
alism and any form of expressing different values, 
political attitudes and behavior are not accepted, 
and if it is more pronounced, it is considered as 
hostile.5 In this sense, ethnocentrism is opposed 
to democracy, which has individualism and politi-
cal pluralism at its very core.
Socio-psychological factors have substantial 
prevalence in ethnocentrism. Namely, authoritari-
anism, conformity and emotions are much stronger 
than cognitive and rational elements. It is this type 
of nationalism that is predominantly a phenomenon 
of individual psychology, which refers more to a set 
of different ethnocentric attitudes and traditional 
value orientations rather than political ideology (cf. 
Šram, 2008: 50-53). Thus ethnocentrism is usu-
ally expressed as a set of attitudes ranging from 
isolation and self-sufficiency, across intolerance 
and exclusion to intolerance and blaming of other 
4 Such nationalism is unfair because of the exclusivity 
and imposing of own interests to others, putting them in 
an unfair or unequal position (cf. Šiber, 1998a: 72-73). 
Also, it restricts freedom and obeys the members of their 
own nation by imposing the proper forms of manifesting 
(national) identity and expression of loyalty (to political 
power). Understood in the context of negative sign, na-
tionalism means the loss of own identity and submitting 
to collective identity. Also, it is marked by suppression 
of rational deliberation and emotional dominance (which 
is why the prejudices and stereotypes are integral part 
of nationalism), closure and collectively oppose to other 
groups (cf. Šiber, 1984: 7-11).
5 “Nationalism shows up as the most powerful ‘secular re-
ligion’ in the twentieth century, especially in nations with 
a dominant pre-modern mentality. In such communities, 
the individual can function as a member of the tribe, in 
which any attempt of individualization is seen as heresy 
and is severely punishable (Blažević, 1995: 56)”.
nations’ members for specific problems of their 
own (individual) and social (national) life. Social 
crises, social turmoil causing anxiety, uncertainty 
and frustration are an extremely favorable social 
and political environment for the development 
of ethnocentrism, while the widespread authori-
tarianism is its characteristic socio-psychological 
background. Prevalence of authoritarianism as a 
socio-psychological disposition exceptionally fa-
vors collectivistic homogenization (cf. Šiber, 1989; 
Šiber, 1998b; Županov, 1993; Bulat and Štrelov, 
1995b; Katunarić, 1995). Periods of social crisis 
are characterized by fear, uncertainty and empha-
sized need for security and belonging. This need 
is usually met by identification with a social group 
(family, nation, class, race, religious group), and 
with this group’s sociocultural characteristics and 
collective psychological symbols. That is why au-
thoritarian individuals (because of their vulnerability, 
passivity and conformism) are suitable objects of 
national homogenization, because of immersion 
into masses where personal identity is lost and 
being guided by the nation as a symbol of collec-
tive identity. Therefore, ethnocentrism is usually 
associated with populist political mobilization led 
by political authorities or populist movements.
Such a dual nature of nationalism is also re-
flected through the distinction between liberal (or 
civic) and ethnic nationalism and between the no-
tions of a civic and an ethnic nation, respectively. 
Thus, the civic nation, basically, means community 
of citizens which are entitled to citizenship based 
on their birth in the state (or naturalization), i.e. 
they are full citizens of a certain state. By creating 
a civic nation, members of ethnic groups (the ma-
jority, but also minority) are legally and politically 
equal. This means that they have equal civil and 
political rights and obligations, regardless of all 
their secondary features and affiliation (such as 
ethnic, racial, sexual, religious, social, economic, 
etc.) which are retained and freely expressed. 
Consent to the same or similar political values, 
principles and social norms, and consensus on 
basic political institutions and procedures – are the 
basis of constitution of the nation. Hence, a civic 
nation establishes itself on the political awareness 
of its members, which is the origin of collective 
(national) identity and basis of unity. National soli-
darity is based primarily on civil status and social 
communication. Belonging to a nation is eminently 
politically determined and liberal nationalism is not 
exclusive to other nations (or ethnic groups). Lib-
eral (or civic) nationalism is based on the ideals of 
political liberalism, which are reflected in aspira-
tions for freedom, civil rights, establishment of a 
national economy, limiting of the state and overall 
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progress (much more than preservation of tradi-
tion, therefore it is more tolerant to individual dif-
ferences). Therefore, it is usually directed towards 
establishing and/or protecting national sovereignty 
and political community (nation-state). Through-
out history, this type of nationalism was the basis 
of political programs of almost all movements for 
national liberation.
The concept of an ethnic nation in turn means 
a community of people affiliated by common ori-
gin, language, religion and history. Ethnic origin, 
traditional values, habits and social norms, in a 
word – authentic culture, are the primary sources 
of social cohesion and basis of national aware-
ness. Ethnic nationalism therefore lies on a nation 
based on ethnicity. It is focused on members of 
their own people (inside and outside the political 
community) and it is exclusive because it promotes 
the welfare of their members while excluding the 
others. In multiethnic political communities it acts 
toward disintegration, promoting intolerance and 
inequality, and reduces the possibility of consen-
sus. In ethnically homogeneous political commu-
nities, it is often immersed in pre-modern ethnic 
symbolism and forms of social organization, and 
acts autarchic and xenophobic. Ethnic nationalism 
reflects its anti-liberal dimension in insistence on 
ethnic identity rather than on universal citizenship 
as well as in emphasizing (imposing) of collective 
values and the nation over the interests of the in-
dividual and society as a whole.6 
These two aspects of a modern nation are 
difficult to separate in real life because they are 
always mixed (no modern nation is exclusively 
civic or ethnic). Nevertheless, significant differ-
ences between them are evident. So, the first 
one is determined eminently politically, while the 
second one has very sociocultural attributes. This 
distinction in turn reflects two general and mutually 
opposed theoretical approaches where the first, 
in explaining these phenomena, understood the 
nation as a social form created at a certain point 
of the historical development of a society or as a 
product (and prerequisite) of social modernization, 
while the second one assumes the nation as natural 
and primordial property of a given community and 
its members. It is a well-known division between 
so-called Western and Eastern nationalism(s).
The first one emphasizes the nation as the 
political constitution of the demos on liberal prin-
ciples and therefore it is inherently pro-demo-
6 Cf. Smith, 1987: 135-138, 149-152; Smith, 2003: 21-24, 
127-130, 214-217; Ipperciel, 2007: 396-397; Hobsbawm, 
1993: 184-185; Massey, Hodson and Sekulić, 2004: 227-
229, 237; Kymlicka, 2001: 243; Matić, 2006: 274; Ramet, 
2006: 11-19; Calhoun, 1993: 394-396, 404-408; Vujčić, 
1998: 29-30.
cratic (a model of a “state” nation, built on the 
French Revolution legacy). The second one is 
anti-democratic; because it highlights the ethnos 
as an integrative and constitutional principle that 
excludes the liberal principle of formation of the 
nation as a political community (the model of a 
“cultural” nation emerged as a product of Romanti-
cism and national revivals of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which had postulated unity of culture and 
language).7 However, the analysis and qualifica-
tion of nationalism(s) on this basis cannot give a 
valid insight into its nature since the elements of 
the Eastern type of nationalism are clearly evident 
in present Western societies and vice versa. Po-
litical and ethnic identification must be analyzed 
within a certain political context and historical 
circumstances.
3. Historical, political and structural aspects 
of Croatian nationalism
In order to properly understand recent nation-
alism in the Croatian society, its main causes and 
manifestations, we have to at least give a brief 
overview of particular periods of modern political 
history. Different social and political conditions in 
certain periods of Croatian nation and state devel-
opment have significantly influenced its contem-
porary main characteristics and manifestations.
Croatian statehood and national independence 
have been an unattainable goal for a long period. 
7 Thus Kohn (1955) argues that Western nationalism is 
result of a process in which state precedes the creation 
of the nation. By creating a state, there were created the 
social, economic and political conditions for the transfor-
mation of people into a nation. This process is based on 
the ideas of liberal democracy (citizens, equal rights, indi-
vidual choice, sovereignty, the rule of law, institutionalized 
power, general political will, and shared values), which 
shaped the civic, liberal type of nationalism. Eastern na-
tionalism in turn derives from the conditions where there 
is no state and it usually appears as a resistance against 
the existing state in which certain nation is often in a sub-
ordinate position. Eastern nationalism is based on ethnic-
ity (cultural identity, origin) and has integrative tendencies 
(trying to create a nation-state as a political community 
of its own members). In this context, it is necessary to 
mention the influential representatives of the modernist 
conception of nation. So, the authors such as E. Gellner, 
E. Kedourie and E. Hobsbawm consider the nation as a 
social construct, a product of modernity, modern artifact 
without natural foundation, the doctrine of the early 19th 
century created on the tradition of the Enlightenment and 
cultural populism, an imaginary community with elements 
of social engineering, stressing the nation primarily as a 
political community, while denying its cultural foundation 
(cf. Gellner, 1991; Kedourie, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1993). 
Their views, though not always consistent, and therefore 
disputed, in many ways has influenced the consolidation 
of stereotype which on such basis qualifying nationalism 
in certain societies as a pro-democratic or anti-democratic.
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The historical Croatian kingdom (as the point of ori-
gin of Croatian statehood) had been long reflected 
in the minds of the Croatian elite and citizens only 
as a myth, and had no actual political meaning. 
At the same time, the political reality of creation 
of the Croatian nation and state was arduous and 
long-term. Throughout the history and during the 
period of shaping of modern European nations, 
the Croatian people were a part of various state 
arrangements, under foreign government, with 
limited political rights and without the possibility of 
realization of national sovereignty. Despite such 
unfavorable conditions, Croats have still managed 
to obtain and preserve the recognition of national 
identity, i.e. the Croatian name and certain politi-
cal privileges (the so-called municipal rights). It 
was the manifestation of the continuity of Croa-
tian sovereign rights according to which they, as 
an individual political entity, had the right to po-
litical autonomy, and as such were a constitutive 
element of state unities they were in. That way, 
Croats were politically shaped, which provided the 
basis to creation of the modern Croatian nation.
It should be noted that the Croatian national 
movement in the development of the national 
idea, ever since the beginning of the 19th century, 
was pronouncedly liberal. For Croatian national-
ism of the 19th and early 20th century, the nation 
was primarily a political and only secondarily an 
ethnical concept. Ethnic characteristics were not 
regarded as sufficient for a nation. Ever since the 
first concepts of the Croatian nation as the bearer 
of sovereignty in the area of the kingdoms of Dal-
matia, Croatia and Slavonia, formed upon a basis 
of tradition of historical municipal rights (as they 
were represented by Narodna stranka and Stranka 
prava, the main Croatian political parties of that 
time), continuing with the stands represented by 
the leading political and cultural representatives 
of the Croatian national resurgence (Lj. Gaj, J. 
J. Strossmayer, P. Preradović, I. Mažuranić, Lj. 
Vukotinović, I. K. Sakcinski and others), and then 
M. Pavlinović and A. Starčević – the nation was 
comprehended as a political association consisting 
of various ethnical and social groups which are in 
political sense constitutive and equal elements of 
the Croatian nation (which, among others, is vis-
ible even in the Illyrian name, which was taken for 
everyone speaking the Croatian language in the 
area of the Triune Kingdom because the Croatian 
name at the time referred only to northern Croatia), 
and in the early 20th century S. Radić, the leader 
of HSS, who in his political program connected the 
ideas of liberalism and social justice, and thought 
of liberal democratic institutions as a prerequisite 
to development of the Croatian nation and state. 
The autocratic regime in the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia and the Serbian repression over the other 
nations generated resistance and strengthened 
nationalism and anti-Serbian spirit. Those rela-
tions yielded the Ustashe, an extreme nationalist 
group which established a Nazi puppet-regime 
during World War II in Croatia which, however, 
did not enjoy a wide support of the people. Due 
to the crimes committed by that regime, it is ar-
guably the darkest part of Croatian history. At the 
same time, it marked a radical deviation from the 
course set by the leading ideologists of the Croa-
tian national movement.8 
After the defeat of Fascism and Nazism and 
end of World War II, the regime established by 
the communists was based on war victory and 
antifascism, and subsequently on politics of in-
dependence and equidistance, which supported 
its internal and international legitimacy, in spite 
of its pronounced anti-democratic character (cf. 
Bilandžić, 1985: 158-178; Sekulić, 2004: 27-31). The 
communists then completely suppressed political 
parties which were supporting a civil democratic 
option of the Croatian national question solution 
(dominant in the pre-war period) and offered a 
federal organization of the new Yugoslavia (six 
republics and two autonomous provinces) which 
was supposed to enable national equality and 
sovereignty to its constitutive nations, including 
Croatia. However, they abolished the multiparty 
system and introduced an authoritarian undem-
ocratic regime based on the ideology of Marxist 
socialism, with a power monopoly by their party. 
That meant a substantial reduction of civil rights 
and political freedoms (including the national ones) 
and open confrontation with political opponents. 
Emphasis of national interests outside the official 
ideological and political discourse gained a quite 
negative connotation, and nationalists were per-
secuted as enemies of the regime. Moreover, the 
sole stressing of ethnicity was systematically sup-
pressed due to the pressure of an ideologically 
promoted socialistic internationalism and under 
the excuse of maintaining balance and prevention 
of ethnical conflicts in the multiethnic federation. 
At the same time, there was a strong encour-
agement of national unity9 as a form of ideologi-
cal integration from above, instead of accepting 
the national individuality and differences as facts 
and basis upon which a multinational community 
8 Cf. Matić, 2006: 275-281; Horvat, 1989: 50-73; Gross and 
Szabo, 1992: 529-531, 565-573; Milardović, Cipek and 
Šišak, 1995: 67-73, 102-190.
9 It was about the concept of “brotherhood and unity”, 
under which tendencies of Yugoslavian unitarism were 
often hidden.
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may integrate organically, from below, on a civil 
base. In that context, many (especially in Croatia) 
reckoned that the former Serbian hegemony and 
the king’s dictatorship at the time of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia had been replaced by Yugoslavian 
unitarism and communist dictatorship.
Although the equality of all peoples and the 
federal organization of the Yugoslav state were 
one of the foundations upon which the communist 
government’s legitimacy stood, the authoritarian 
communist regime generated nationalism, mostly 
by repression and/or suppression the freedom of 
national expression whenever it crossed certain 
boundaries. Those boundaries were in turn defined 
by the limits set by the authoritarian government, 
primarily by the postulates of the ruling communist 
ideology and the imperative of maintaining the 
multinational federation, and the power monopoly 
of the communist party (the only one retaining the 
right to interpret national interests).
In such conditions, nationalism in Croatian so-
ciety was latent, but in some crisis periods even 
very open. It was similar in other parts of the for-
mer multinational state, although in Croatia, given 
its relatively greater economic development (and 
thus more funding to the federal budget) and the 
population size, it was slightly more pronounced. 
Since the late 1960s, the efforts of Croatian com-
munist leadership were directed towards liberaliza-
tion of the political system, i.e. towards economic 
reform and greater economic and political indepen-
dence of Croatia within the federation. Especially 
emphasized were the demands for reduction of 
control of federal authorities, particularly over the 
redistribution of material goods by which Croa-
tia was systematically economically exploited in 
favor of other, less developed republics, including 
Serbia (demand for “clean bills”). They were also 
associated with demands for the freedom of ex-
pression and autonomous articulation of national 
interests (political, economic, and cultural). Those 
demands were backed by a significant portion of 
Croatian public, and they culminated in mass pro-
tests 1971 when numerous citizens have publicly 
displayed dissatisfaction with the status quo. They 
gave strong and open support to Croatian pro-
democratic political leadership and emphasized 
demands for greater independence of Croatia (a 
movement known as “Croatian spring”). However, 
the Croatian national-democratic movement was 
declared nationalistic and contra-revolutionary, 
brutally quelled, and its leadership and numer-
ous participants were politically stigmatized and 
subjected to repression. Although those events 
directly influenced the Yugoslav Constitution of 
1974, in which the republics gained a considerably 
higher level of autonomy and a formal statehood, 
and despite the proclamation of national equality 
and solidarity as basic values (“brotherhood and 
unity”) – the fact of substantially limited freedom 
of national expression (and political freedoms in 
general) remained. The communist regime could 
not effectively articulate them without democrati-
zation, which would in turn bring into question the 
monopoly of the Communist Party, and hence its 
survival on power.
After the death of J. B. Tito, there was no more 
such an authority to be the arbiter between the fed-
eral and the republics’ party leaders and guarantee 
the preservation of the state unity, so the political 
processes of decentralization in Yugoslavia grew 
stronger. However, they did not take place in a 
democratic manner, but instead bureaucratically 
and on a political level – by deals and agreements 
between leaders of republic branches of the Com-
munist Party (known as “negotiable” economy and 
policy). Meanwhile, the urgently needed reforms 
(economic reform on free market basis, liberaliza-
tion and democratization of the political system) 
which had the potential to organically reconnect 
the republics on brand new foundations, while 
keeping (even strengthening) their political and 
economic independence – failed to occur. This in 
turn led to increasingly larger conflicts between 
the advocates of federalism, decentralization and 
greater republic rights, and their opponents – sup-
porters of a tighter federation, larger degree of 
centralization and strengthening the authority of 
the federal state.10 Those processes did not lead 
to stabilization, but instead to increasingly bigger 
inner instability (amplified by the deepening eco-
nomic crisis) and, finally, the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav federation.
At the end of that period, at a time when com-
munist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
begin to collapse, and nationalism(s) in the country 
are getting stronger, it was clear that Yugoslavia 
could not survive in the existing form. In such a 
situation political authority in Croatia (then al-
ready reformed communists) leaves the federal 
Communist Party (at its famous 14th Congress 
in 1990), liberalizes political space and organizes 
free multiparty democratic elections. Although 
they were significantly fostered by the pressure 
10 Political power of the once unified Communist Party in 
leading political and social development of the state rap-
idly declined by its increasingly intense disintegration in 
republic branches of the Communist Party. It happened 
because of shifting the emphasis from “working-class” 
to “national”, which republics as federal entities has es-
tablished as states. It in turn undermined collectiveness 
of Yugoslavia and unity of the Party (cf. Bilandžić, 1985: 
512-534, 1986: 165-167).
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of threatening nationalism and hegemonism from 
Serbia, and by growing inner pressures for democ-
ratization and national independence (accusation 
for “Croatian silence”, i.e. for their long hesitation 
to react) – it was genuinely democratic act. Even 
more, their strategies, as well as the strategies of 
the new democratically elected government, were 
directed towards association of Croatia with the 
united Europe.11 The other republic governments 
(except the Slovenian one) were indecisive about 
it, wanting to (each for its own reasons) keep the 
Yugoslav federation alive. The motivation of the 
Serbian government was its instrumentalization 
for its own political and economic interests (the 
concept of unitary and centralized Yugoslavia as 
an expanded Serbia).
It was obviously that Yugoslav federation, as 
a state, and communist internationalism as ideol-
ogy have failed to provide national equality and 
freedom. Although the regime significantly based 
its legitimacy on overcoming national conflicts, it 
did not succeed because of its authoritarianism 
and ideologically based integration of the political 
community. Ultimately, it delegitimized the regime 
along with the underlying ideology, and opened 
the questions of justifiability and purpose of further 
existence of the Yugoslav multinational commu-
nity. On the other hand, the long lasting suppres-
sion of national feelings produced a certain col-
lective frustration. Besides that, authoritarianism 
and conformism as dominant socio-psychological 
characteristics has also contributed to permanent 
existence of interethnic tensions during the com-
munist regime, although mostly latent. All of this 
were the reasons why the nationalism erupted 
with such force into the public area, right after the 
collapse of the regime.
One of the key structural factors explaining the 
emergence of nationalism and its manifestations 
is the limited social modernization during the com-
munist rule. Modernization has made considerable 
progress in the industrialization, technological de-
velopment and education. An adequate social stan-
dard was achieved, primarily in the social sphere, 
and over the time a matching social structure was 
formed (working class, bureaucracy, profession-
als, middle class). However, such modernization 
11 The goal of Croatian and Slovenian political leaders was 
not to escape, but to join Europe. Their action was blocked 
by the Serbian integralist strategy of uniting Yugoslavia 
on a pro-Russian and anti-European basis. However, with 
the collapse of communism and the disappearance of the 
Soviet threat, and the European integration policy of Ger-
many, Austria and Italy (which is why they were no longer 
a threat as it once was, but rather the opposite) – were 
gone those (earlier very important) reasons for preserva-
tion of Yugoslavia, as well as the inner legitimacy of its 
regime (cf. Sekulić, 2004: 31-32).
was not organic and endogenous as it was in the 
West, i.e. based on free market and free society 
in which various social actors had an initiative. 
Instead, it was imposed and carried out as state 
policy led by the Communist Party according to 
an ideological basis. Despite the development of 
industrial production, the requirements for cre-
ation of civil society as a main realm of sociabil-
ity with intermediate civil organizations, diversity 
of public discourses and political pluralism – the 
indispensable prerequisites of democracy – were 
entirely absent in such conditions. There occurred 
a process of modernization without modernity (cf. 
Dahrendorf, 1990), industrial development with-
out civic development, an ideological instead of 
societal integration.
The communist state had taken over the space 
of civil society by political mobilization of the citi-
zens through the artificial quasi-social associations, 
while traditional norms gave way to ideological 
ones (which, nota bene, were in many ways just 
adapted traditional egalitarian and collectivistic 
norms). Thus society was atomized in a large 
number of unconnected individuals; while on the 
other side was the state, i.e. “the organized peo-
ple” in ideologically based and Communist Party-
controlled political organizations.12 There was no 
sufficiently independent and autonomous social 
segment (interest, class, gender, occupational, 
age, and similar groups) that could develop other 
public discourses and collective identities than 
those allowed by regime, and to be at least a 
substitute to civil society and alternative to Com-
munist Party leaders.13 The absence of that key 
segment and authoritarianism and repressiveness 
of the regime blocked political action outside of 
the allowed framework. Therefore the nation and 
nationalism, in the moment of crisis and the col-
lapse of the system, were the dominant (if not 
only) political content with the potential to fill in 
12 Integration of societal community there is not based on 
organic elements, from the “bottom”, by the interests-
politically connections within the democratically regulated 
pluralistic space of civil society, but instead political power 
integrates the society “from above” by political-ideological 
compression of different social groups in a single political 
system. The purpose of such integration is a dulling of the 
natural social antagonisms by restricting, eliminating or 
neutralizing social conflicts (cf. Tadić, 1988: 140).
13 To consider communist social organizations (such as the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People, youth organizations, 
trade unions etc.) as segments of civil society is not pos-
sible because they were actually part of the state appara-
tus. Through them, the social life was monitored, instead 
of being free and opposed to the state and government. 
“The consequence was mass alienation and distrust of 
the Communist regime and a lingering cynicism toward 
both political and civil institutions (Mishler and Rose, 1997, 
420)”.
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the empty space between the atomized individual 
and the state, and articulate society as a political 
community.
4. Nationalism during the democratic transition 
and establishment of the nation state
The deepening of the political and economic 
crisis of the Yugoslavian federation and increas-
ingly pronounced threats of growing Greater Ser-
bian nationalism and hegemonist policy of Serbia 
had an effect on the increase in discontent and 
fear of uncertainty which would be brought by fur-
ther staying in Yugoslavia. At the same time, they 
affected the increase of nationalism as reaction 
to those threats and, even more, they fostered 
an articulation of general will of the vast major-
ity of Croatian citizens toward final realization of 
national freedom and sovereignty. Therefore the 
separation from the Yugoslav federation and the 
establishment of an independent and sovereign 
nation-state were a true expression of a histori-
cal aspiration of the Croatian people for achieve-
ment of its political identity and autonomy in all 
aspects. Besides, that act had double democratic 
legitimacy because in the atmosphere of general 
collapse of communism and collapse of the mul-
tinational Yugoslav community, as an expression 
of the general will of the people, it proclaimed the 
establishment of democracy (as a political com-
mitment) and the establishment of an independent 
national state (as a realization of democratic right 
to self-determination). That was precisely the most 
distinguished manifestation of the liberal and civil 
dimension of Croatian nationalism, which was in 
the foundation of the independent, sovereign and 
democratic Croatian state.
However, under the influence of specific con-
ditions in which the processes of establishing of 
nation state and democratic system took place, 
nationalism was increasingly acquired the char-
acteristics of ethnocentrism. There were multiple 
causes for that. Foremost, the absence of a sov-
ereign nation-state and the long lasting status of 
political, economic and cultural submission during 
the modern history remained/became a burden to 
Croatian nation. Besides the strong commitment to 
national independence and sovereignty as a legiti-
mate liberal aspiration, it also produced a certain 
collective frustration, particularly in conditions of 
crisis and dissolution of the Yugoslav federation 
and threatening Greater Serbian hegemonism. 
In that situation, leading political elites, but also 
a substantial part of the citizens, have increas-
ingly manifested their national feelings through 
the national exclusivism. On the other hand, 
authoritarianism and political exclusiveness as 
undemocratic legacy of Yugoslavian communist 
regime have significantly influenced the formation 
of same or similar characteristics of nationalism 
(not only in Croatia). Because of limitations of 
political freedoms, especially the freedom of ex-
pression of national feelings and articulation of 
national interests, that regime was perceived as a 
framework of unfreedom for the Croatian people. 
Therefore nationalism has simultaneously mani-
fested as revanchism towards the regime (anti-
communism) and as exclusiveness towards other 
nations (ethnocentrism).
To those primarily political causes we should 
add the economic ones. Namely, the economic cri-
sis culminated at the end of the 1980s and, along 
with the political crisis, significantly contributed to 
the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. At 
the same time, it also contributed to the develop-
ment of ethnocentrism not only in the Croatian 
society, but in other republics as well. Uncertainty, 
increasing economic problems (indebtedness, in-
flation, unemployment, goods shortages, energy 
reductions, decline of living standard), political 
disputes and growing political instability – affected 
the spreading of apathy and pessimism, but also 
the increase of discontent and frustration, anger 
and national intolerance.
One of the key causes that affect increase in 
ethnocentrism was the sociocultural discontinuity. 
It was a direct consequence of transitional process 
which consists of complete transformation in which 
the society abandons the old social and political 
system whose values and norms are no longer 
valid, and builds a new system whose values and 
norms are not yet established, therefore not yet 
internalized among the citizens. In that situation, 
occurring an anomie as a values and norms sys-
tem crisis. In that interregnum, the renewed and 
the strengthened values of the traditional complex 
prevailed. They had the function of a socio-psy-
chological support and a source of security. Lack 
of democratic experience (hence an insufficient 
presence of democratic values) and deepening 
of political and economic crisis was considerably 
contributed to it. Consequently, such situation 
significantly favored the strengthening of ethno-
centric characteristics of nationalism.14 
14 The results of research of sociocultural aspects of the transi-
tion in Croatia (Štulhofer and Karajić, 1996/1997: 23) indicate 
a very prominent dimension of ethnocentrism among respon-
dents. Directly or indirectly, many other studies of nationalism 
confirm its pronounced presence as a constant in the Croatian 
society, especially in the first decade of transition (cf. Šiber, 
1984b; Radin, 1991; Blažević, 1995; Bulat and Štrelov, 1995a, 
1995b; Mirić, 1996; Šiber, 1998a; Zakošek, 1998; Ilišin, 1998; 
Caratan, 1998; Pusić, 1999; Karajić, 2000; Galić, 2000).
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However, the greatest generator of ethnocen-
trism undoubtedly was the Greater Serbian na-
tionalism which gradually grew in strength with the 
crisis of Yugoslav federation. Rightfully perceived 
as a threat (regarding to its hegemonist character 
evident from the very beginning in politics of redefin-
ing the basic provisions of the Constitution of 1974 
and pretensions toward limiting the independence 
of the republics) the Greater Serbian nationalism 
directly influenced the strengthening of national-
ism among all non-Serbian nations in Yugoslavia. 
The Greater Serbian war aggression that followed 
it up, has directly jeopardized the survival of the 
newly established Croatian state and people, and 
extremely contributed to the strengthening and 
spreading of ethnocentrism. Particularly impor-
tant is the fact that the aggression was initiated 
and helped by armed rebellion of a large part of 
Serbian citizens in Croatia in areas where they 
were the majority. Instrumentalized and conducted 
by the nationalist government of Serbia and the 
Yugoslav army (which completely took the side 
of the Greater Serbian hegemonist interests) the 
rebels were direct actors of the military aggression 
and occupation. Among the Croatian citizenry it 
was perceived as a betrayal and an unprovoked 
attack. This in turn strongly affected the increase 
of intolerance and national exclusiveness towards 
Serbs and the Serbian minority in Croatia due to 
the identification of Serbs and Yugoslavia with the 
Greater Serbian aggressive politics. The enormous 
human suffering and material damage brought 
by the war aggression additionally petrified the 
pronounced ethnocentrism and anticommunism.
Nationalism had a key role in dismantling the 
communist regime and in process of achieving 
state independence. However, the contribution of 
nationalism to the creation of a nation-state does 
not mean it contributed to the establishment of a 
democratic state. Quite the opposite – within the 
space of undeveloped institutions of the rule-of-
law and welfare state, and in the wartime condi-
tions, extremely unfavorable for democratic de-
velopment – so formed nationalism contributed 
to authoritarian tendencies and even to blocking 
of democratization process. New, democratically 
elected government replaced the former authori-
tarian communist rule. However, manifesting itself 
far more as a nationalist and populist movement 
than as a modern democratic party, the new gov-
ernment kept the political style of its predeces-
sors in many ways. Above all, it was manifested 
in the symbiosis of the ruling party and the (na-
tion-) state, and in the (undemocratic) political 
practice coming out of it. 
In that period, the government used the nation-
alist homogenization in order to neutralize the dif-
ferences of interest in the society (mainly socioeco-
nomic) and their political articulation. Significantly 
assisting was the underdevelopment of political 
parties and democratic institutions, allowing for 
an arbitrary function of the government. In such 
context, marked by disintegration of old forms of 
sociability, nationalism becomes a substitute for 
organic integration factors absent in undeveloped 
society. However, when identification and social 
solidarity based on rational foundations are being 
suppressed by ideological and collectivist factors 
(such as nationalism) – which are thereby es-
tablished as a basis for individual and collective 
identity – the foundations of democracy slip away.
Despite the normative constitution and formal 
proclamations, the political system was not found-
ed on liberal democratic values and the right(s) of 
the citizen as a political subject, but on a collec-
tive right of the people and the state, which were 
superordinate to individual rights, freedom, and 
autonomy. Consequently, the establishment of de-
mocracy upon individualism, equality, and respect 
of civil rights and political freedoms remained in 
shadow of achieving national sovereignty and in-
dependence. In other words, the idea of national 
liberation was hypertrophied at the expense of 
the democratization.
The enthusiasm of the people about the Croa-
tian state as a finally realized national dream, on 
the one side, and the situation of objectively en-
dangered nation on the other – has conditioned 
the absence of objectivity and criticism towards 
many undemocratic characteristics of the new 
state. Equally so, the absence of democratic 
(civic) culture and the traumatic war experiences 
of a substantial part of population – additionally 
strengthened the acceptance and justification 
of the government’s authoritarian populism, but 
also the ethnocentrism as normal and intelligible. 
Among the many citizens in that period there was 
a thin line between ethnocentrism and patriotism, 
either in its understanding, expressing or accept-
ing (justifying).
By the end of the war the external pressures 
– often used by the government as a pretext for 
justification of difficult social and political circum-
stances – were disappeared. Already established, 
liberated and internationally recognized nation 
state has diminished possibilities of further anath-
ematization of the political opposition and all other 
opponents as insufficiently national aware. It re-
sulted in a political agenda which favoring increas-
ingly more socioeconomic than political (national) 
issues. That was a clear indicator of democratic 
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maturing of Croatian society and shifting the weight 
from traditional, collectivist and affective behav-
ior to a more modern, rational and interest-based 
one. The period of opening the Croatian society 
to the world, following the change of the political 
government in 2000, influenced the changes in 
the collective perception of their own nation, es-
pecially in the context of new political relationships 
and the position of Croatia in the international 
surroundings (the processes of joining the EU 
and NATO). In that period, increasingly so during 
the second decade of transition, a large ebb of 
ethnocentrism is evident, as well as its reduction 
to the level and manifestations usual in Western 
democratic societies.
The constantly present nationalism in many 
West European societies, especially the open 
ethnic conflicts breaking out occasionally, and 
the increase of nationalism, ethnic, racial, and 
religious intolerance and exclusiveness – which 
in particular showed in the recent global crisis – 
show that even the most developed democracies 
haven’t overcome the problems causing them, nor 
have they found adequate ways to solve them.15 
At the same time, it should be noted that the rea-
sons generating ethnocentrism in the Croatian 
society were much more serious than the rea-
sons causing such occurrences in contemporary 
developed democratic societies. That serves as 
another indicator that the claims of ethnocentrism 
as an “inherent” characteristic of Croatian society 
– often coming from certain political and scientific 
circles of the West during the past two decades 
– are not valid, in spite of insufficient presence of 
democratic values among the citizens.
5. Conclusion
Nationalism significantly marked the processes 
of democratic transition of many post-communist 
countries; especially those emerged from disinte-
gration of multinational federations, such as Croa-
tia. The pronounced Croatian nationalism prior to 
the onset of democratic changes, and even more 
after them, was an expression of legitimate aspi-
rations of a vast majority of the Croatian people 
for national liberation and state independence. 
15 It is about political conflicts in the United Kingdom (North-
ern Ireland), France (Corsica), Spain (Basque Country, 
Catalonia), Italy (South Tyrol), Belgium (Flanders and 
Wallonia), Canada (Quebec), and about strengthening of 
(right) political radicalism, nationalist exclusion and rac-
ism directed against immigrants and ethnic minorities in 
the most developed countries in Europe (Netherlands, 
France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland). The recent eco-
nomic crisis has been just the catalyst of apparently latent 
ethnocentrism which exists in those societies under the 
surface.
That nationalism was led by liberal ideas of re-
alization of freedom and equality, establishment 
of democracy and market economy, and by the 
feelings of affiliation to West European cultural 
circle. It necessarily meant the secession from 
Yugoslavia, which political framework did not 
allow it. On the other side, first the crisis of the 
communist regime and the dissolution of the Yu-
goslav federation, and then the Greater Serbian 
aggression – which directly jeopardized the inde-
pendence and existence of the newly established 
Croatian state – were the causes of substantial 
increase of intolerance and national exclusiveness, 
i.e. pronounced ethnocentrism which significantly 
marked the political and social life during the first 
decade of democratic transition.
Besides its liberal and patriotic character, na-
tionalism, on the one side, was the instrument of 
the government, firstly in political mobilization of 
citizens in processes of secession and creation 
of the nation state, and then as a basis of legiti-
macy of post-communist regime and their stays 
on power. On the other side, nationalism was a 
mode of unleashing suppressed dissatisfaction 
and many interests which under the communist 
regime didn’t have the space for articulation and 
organization due to political unfreedom and un-
developed civil society. Liberalization and demo-
cratic changes opened up that space, but in the 
conditions of structural underdevelopment (due to 
limited modernization in the communist period), 
non-existence of civic culture and democratic ex-
perience – it didn’t function as free and autono-
mous public space. Instead, it still remained under 
the strong influence of political actors, particularly 
government. That structural deficiency resulted 
that the nationalism became the main (political) 
content that fulfilled that space. In other words, 
(underdeveloped) civil society was incorporated 
into a (nation-) state.
The disappearance of the old, ideologically 
based system, upon which identity, loyalty and 
social hierarchy were based, conditioned a strong 
need for new identification. However, the forma-
tion of new identity happened in the conditions 
of non-existing social base of political pluralism 
and disintegration of norms and values (anomy) 
caused by the collapse of one and underdevel-
opment of new system, restoration of traditional 
value patterns, and undemocratic aberrations of 
government. In such circumstances, on the indi-
vidual level, appear uncertainty and insecurity. 
Individualism weakens, and collective identities 
(functioning as a socio-psychological “refuge”) 
and traditional patterns (as a socio-psychological 
defense from the new and unknown) strengthen, 
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and conformism towards the government appears. 
In that context, nationalism grows stronger and 
has distinct identificational meaning (on the level 
of the individual and his/her need to belong to a 
community) and cohesive strength (on a societal 
level).
Finally, under conditions of an immediate threat 
to personal and collective existence caused by 
Greater Serbian aggression and the war for libera-
tion, it is understandable for nationalism to grow 
into a general political discourse expressing pa-
triotism, but also political alignment towards the 
nation state and the government, even in spite of 
their serious democratic deficit. Those extreme 
conditions directly generated ethnocentric manifes-
tations of nationalism which, on individual (socio-
psychological) inasmuch on collective (societal, 
political) level functioned both as identificational 
and defensive mechanisms.
Therefore, ethnocentrism cannot be compre-
hended as an inherent characteristic of Croatian 
(or any other) society, despite insufficient presence 
of democratic values. Although sociocultural and 
political heritage in many respects favors authori-
tarian and illiberal characteristics, ethnocentric 
manifestations are primarily caused by structural 
factors, both the endogenous and exogenous. 
Thus the nationalism, which marked the period 
of democratic transition of the Croatian society, 
isn’t an “innate” cultural trait, but a social phenom-
enon directly caused by certain social and political 
context. Nationalism, in considered period, occurs 
primarily as a consequence of political unfreedom 
and limited modernization during the period of 
communism, then as response to specific condi-
tions of democratic transition (which consists of 
simultaneous processes of democratization and 
nation state establishment, political and social 
discontinuity, anomie and lack of adaptedness to 
the new system – all caused by deep transitional 
changes), and as reaction to external pressures 
(particularly war aggression). Manifestations of 
nationalism, including the ethnocentrism as the 
most pronounced, was directly induced and shaped 
by them. With consolidation of the new social 
and political system and weakening of the outer 
pressure(s), nationalism wanes. Normalization of 
social and political life after the war and the period 
of post-war recovery, and the renewed processes 
of democratization during the second decade of 
the transition – contributed to a considerable de-
cline of ethnocentrism and strengthening of liberal 
characteristics of nationalism.
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Nacionalizam u hrvatskoj demokratskoj tranziciji: između strukturne 
uvjetovanosti i utjecaja naslijeđa povijesti i političke kulture
PERO MALDINI
Sveučilište u Dubrovniku
Nacionalizam je obilježio demokratsku tranziciju mnogih postkomunističkih 
društava, među njima i hrvatskog. S jedne strane, on je pokazao svoj liberalni 
karakter potaknuvši demokratske promjene i ostvarenje državne samostalnosti. 
S druge strane, manifestirao se kao isključivi etnocentrizam koji je znatno uspo-
rio demokratizacijski proces i koji se nametnuo kao njegovo glavno obilježje. U 
članku se pokazuje neutemeljenost stava koji etnocentrizam smatra inherentnim 
svojstvom tzv. istočnih (etničkih) nacija, držeći ih zbog toga nedemokratičnima i 
sklonima etničkim konfliktima, dok istovremeno nacionalizmu zapadnih (civilnih) 
nacija pripisuje imanentno liberalni karakter. Uz objašnjenje povijesnih, političko-
kulturnih i sociopsiholoških aspekta nacionalizma u Hrvatskoj, upućuje se na 
njegovu primarno strukturnu i kontekstualnu uvjetovanost, pri čemu se posebno 
ističu okvir političke neslobode i ograničena modernizacija u razdoblju komuniz-
ma, te specifični uvjeti demokratske tranzicije obilježene stvaranjem nacionalne 
države i Domovinskim ratom. Nacionalizam se tu pojavljuje kao izraz domolju-
blja i političke identifikacije, ali i kao odgovor na društveni, politički i vrijednosni 
diskontinuitet (kriza i dezintegracija starog i neprilagođenost novom sustavu) i 
poglavito kao reakcija na vanjski pritisak (rat). Osporava se njegova inherent-
nost budući da on nije neka urođena kulturna crta, već društveni fenomen koji je 
izravno uvjetovan društvenim i političkim kontekstom. Zaključuje se da je nacio-
nalizam u razdoblju demokratske tranzicije u Hrvatskoj, usprkos neprijepornim 
etnocentrističkim manifestacijama, u svojoj osnovi ipak liberalan, na tragu os-
tvarenja državotvorne ideje i uspostave demokratskog poretka. Normalizacija 
društvenog i političkog života nakon rata i obnovljeni procesi demokratizacije 
tijekom drugoga tranzicijskog desetljeća, pridonijeli su znatnom opadanju etno-
centrizma i jačanju liberalnih obilježja nacionalizma. 
Ključne riječi: nacionalizam, etnocentrizam, demokratska tranzicija, 
nacionalna država, postkomunistička društva, Hrvatska 
